When studying automatic, biometric face recognition it is import to understand what an appropriate baseline performance level is. Research has often shown that humans are actually not that good at doing face recognition, especially when comparing a photograph with a person in front of them.
Here is some more research in this area.
Experiments suggest that telling if two unfamiliar faces are the same or different is no easy task. … A new article in Applied Cognitive Psychology confirms these fears, suggesting that our real-world capacity to spot fakes in their natural setting is even worse than imagined.
I am helping out on the Program Committee for the USEC’14 workshop. The workshop will take place as part of the Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium in February 2014 in San Diego. Consider submitting your work.
The workshop on Usable Security invites submissions on all aspects of human factors and usability in the context of security. USEC’14 aims to bring together researchers already engaged in this interdisciplinary effort with other computer science researchers in areas such as visualization, artificial intelligence and theoretical computer science as well as researchers from other domains such as economics or psychology.
From Dustin Kirkland, an interesting way to think about fingerprints:
I could see some value, perhaps, in a tablet that I share with my wife, where each of us have our own accounts, with independent configurations, apps, and settings. We could each conveniently identify ourselves by our fingerprint. But biometrics cannot, and absolutely must not, be used to authenticate an identity. For authentication, you need a password or passphrase. Something that can be independently chosen, changed, and rotated. I will continue to advocate this within the Ubuntu development community, as I have since 2009.
From the Canyon Edge: Fingerprints are Usernames, not Passwords.
I am currently at the BTAS conference in Washington DC getting up to speed on the latest research on biometrics. Here are a few trends I have observed so far:
- an obvious lack of research on what I would call traditional biometric problems, including fingerprint matching, iris matching, and face recognition for high quality, passport style photos. These appear to be mostly solved problems.
- recognition of spoofing as a challenging problem, as is evident in the quick attacks against the iPhone 5S fingerprint sensor,
- a continuing trend to focus on challenging acquisition environments, included face photos taken at an angle (faces in the wild) and matching from video.
- more interest in different kinds of sensors, including cell phone cameras, touch pads, and the Kinect.
Here is some more information about the conference:
BTAS 2013 … is the premier research conference focused on all aspects of biometrics. It is intended to have a broad scope, including advances in fundamental signal processing, image processing, pattern recognition and statistical and mathematical techniques relevant to biometrics, new algorithms and/or technologies for biometrics, analysis of specific applications, and analysis of the social impact of biometrics technology.
BTAS 2013 | Biometrics: Theory, Applications and Systems.
Here is an interesting EFF article about the recent report from the Human Rights Council on anonymity, encryption, and free speech.
Today, governments all around the world are seeking to ban, block, or redesign personal communications technologies based on a misguided notion that these technologies are too secure.
Anonymity, Encryption, and Free Expression: What Nations Need to Do | Electronic Frontier Foundation.
The Security and Human Behaviour event is on now in California. This is an interesting event that cross many traditional boundaries including computer science, psychology, sociology, political science, and philosophy.
Bruce Schneier has provided a description and links to live coverage provided by Ross Anderson and Vaibhav Garg.
A new book chapter by Jean Camp and myself is now available. It appears in a new collection edited by George Yee titled Privacy Protection Measures and Technologies in Business Organizations: Aspects and Standards. Here is the abstract, citation information, and link to the book.
In August 2007 approximately 445,000 letters were sent to retirees who belonged to the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS). This was a routine mailing, but all or a portion of each pensioner’s Social Security Number (SSN) was printed on the address panel of the envelopes, making this event all but ordinary. This massive breach of sensitive SSNs, along with names and addresses, exposed these people to potential identity theft and fraud. What are the harms associated with a data breach of this nature? How can those harms be mitigated? What are, or should be, the costs and consequences to the organization releasing the data? While it is very difficult to predict the specific consequences of a data breach of this nature, a statistical model can be used to estimate the likely financial repercussions for individuals and organizations, and the recent settlement in the TJX case provides a good model of harm mitigation that could be applied in this case and similar cases.
Patrick, A. S., & Camp, L. J. (2012). Harm mitigation from the release of personal identity information. In Yee, G. O. (Ed.), Privacy Protection Measures and Technologies in Business Organizations: Aspects and Standards. (pp. 309-330).
Here are some upcoming events that you might be interested in.
- Presenter: Privacy & Information Security Congress 2011, November 28-29, 2011, Ottawa. I will be presenting about privacy and location-based services.
- Attending: Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2012. February 27 – March 2, 2012, Bonaire.
Financial Cryptography and Data Security is a major international forum for research, advanced development, education, exploration, and debate regarding information assurance, with a specific focus on commercial contexts. The conference covers all aspects of securing transactions and systems. Original works focusing on both fundamental and applied real-world deployments on all aspects surrounding commerce security are solicited.
- Program Committee: Workshop on Usable Security. March 2, 2012. Part of Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2012, Bonaire.
- Of Interest: Workshop on Ethics in Computer Security Research. March 2, 2012. Part of Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2012, Bonaire.
- Program Committee: Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2012). July 11-13, 2012, Washington, DC. This symposium will bring together an interdisciplinary group of researchers and practitioners in human computer interaction, security, and privacy. The program features technical papers, workshops and tutorials, a poster session, panels and invited talks, and discussion sessions.
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada is calling for proposals for cutting-edge privacy research and public education projects in Canada. The application deadline is March 14, 2011.
The Office is interested in receiving research proposals focusing on four priority areas:
1) identity integrity and protection,
2) information technology,
3) genetic privacy, and
4) public safety.
However, the Office will continue to accept research proposals on issues that fall outside these areas.
As well, the Office invites proposals to fund public education and regional outreach initiatives that aim to inform Canadians about their privacy rights and how they may better protect their personal information.
All proposals will be evaluated on the basis of merit by OPC officials, and the maximum amount that can be awarded for each research or public education project is $50,000. (A maximum of $100,000 can be awarded per organization.)
Not-for-profit organizations, including education institutions and industry and trade associations, are eligible, and this includes consumer, voluntary and advocacy organizations.
Ars Technica has an interesting article describing in detail how the group Anonymous was able to penetrate and embarrass the security firm HBGary and the rootkit.com site.
This was not a particularly advanced attack, but rather one that focused on known weaknesses, bad practices, and social engineering of people who should know better.
Most frustrating for HBGary must be the knowledge that they know what they did wrong, and they were perfectly aware of best practices; they just didn’t actually use them. Everybody knows you don’t use easy-to-crack passwords, but some employees did. Everybody knows you don’t re-use passwords, but some of them did. Everybody knows that you should patch servers to keep them free of known security flaws, but they didn’t.