When studying automatic, biometric face recognition it is import to understand what an appropriate baseline performance level is. Research has often shown that humans are actually not that good at doing face recognition, especially when comparing a photograph with a person in front of them.
Experiments suggest that telling if two unfamiliar faces are the same or different is no easy task. … A new article in Applied Cognitive Psychology confirms these fears, suggesting that our real-world capacity to spot fakes in their natural setting is even worse than imagined.
From Dustin Kirkland, an interesting way to think about fingerprints:
I could see some value, perhaps, in a tablet that I share with my wife, where each of us have our own accounts, with independent configurations, apps, and settings. We could each conveniently identify ourselves by our fingerprint. But biometrics cannot, and absolutely must not, be used to authenticate an identity. For authentication, you need a password or passphrase. Something that can be independently chosen, changed, and rotated. I will continue to advocate this within the Ubuntu development community, as I have since 2009.
I am currently at the BTAS conference in Washington DC getting up to speed on the latest research on biometrics. Here are a few trends I have observed so far:
an obvious lack of research on what I would call traditional biometric problems, including fingerprint matching, iris matching, and face recognition for high quality, passport style photos. These appear to be mostly solved problems.
recognition of spoofing as a challenging problem, as is evident in the quick attacks against the iPhone 5S fingerprint sensor,
a continuing trend to focus on challenging acquisition environments, included face photos taken at an angle (faces in the wild) and matching from video.
more interest in different kinds of sensors, including cell phone cameras, touch pads, and the Kinect.
Here is some more information about the conference:
BTAS 2013 … is the premier research conference focused on all aspects of biometrics. It is intended to have a broad scope, including advances in fundamental signal processing, image processing, pattern recognition and statistical and mathematical techniques relevant to biometrics, new algorithms and/or technologies for biometrics, analysis of specific applications, and analysis of the social impact of biometrics technology.
A new book chapter by Jean Camp and myself is now available. It appears in a new collection edited by George Yee titled Privacy Protection Measures and Technologies in Business Organizations: Aspects and Standards. Here is the abstract, citation information, and link to the book.
In August 2007 approximately 445,000 letters were sent to retirees who belonged to the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS). This was a routine mailing, but all or a portion of each pensioner’s Social Security Number (SSN) was printed on the address panel of the envelopes, making this event all but ordinary. This massive breach of sensitive SSNs, along with names and addresses, exposed these people to potential identity theft and fraud. What are the harms associated with a data breach of this nature? How can those harms be mitigated? What are, or should be, the costs and consequences to the organization releasing the data? While it is very difficult to predict the specific consequences of a data breach of this nature, a statistical model can be used to estimate the likely financial repercussions for individuals and organizations, and the recent settlement in the TJX case provides a good model of harm mitigation that could be applied in this case and similar cases.
The Office is interested in receiving research proposals focusing on four priority areas:
1) identity integrity and protection,
2) information technology,
3) genetic privacy, and
4) public safety.
However, the Office will continue to accept research proposals on issues that fall outside these areas.
As well, the Office invites proposals to fund public education and regional outreach initiatives that aim to inform Canadians about their privacy rights and how they may better protect their personal information.
All proposals will be evaluated on the basis of merit by OPC officials, and the maximum amount that can be awarded for each research or public education project is $50,000. (A maximum of $100,000 can be awarded per organization.)
Not-for-profit organizations, including education institutions and industry and trade associations, are eligible, and this includes consumer, voluntary and advocacy organizations.
Ars Technica has an interesting article describing in detail how the group Anonymous was able to penetrate and embarrass the security firm HBGary and the rootkit.com site.
This was not a particularly advanced attack, but rather one that focused on known weaknesses, bad practices, and social engineering of people who should know better.
Most frustrating for HBGary must be the knowledge that they know what they did wrong, and they were perfectly aware of best practices; they just didn’t actually use them. Everybody knows you don’t use easy-to-crack passwords, but some employees did. Everybody knows you don’t re-use passwords, but some of them did. Everybody knows that you should patch servers to keep them free of known security flaws, but they didn’t.
Recently, the Gawker family of web sites suffered a data breach where millions of password records were stolen and many of the passwords were cracked and published. This incident revealed, once again, that many people are using very weak passwords, but this article also discusses other important lessons.
A key lesson from the attack is that any large password collector must have a plan for responding to a compromised password file — Gawker’s technical inability to force password updates or even email their users is inexcusable. Still, these measures can’t contain the damage. The biggest missed angle on this story is that it’s not just a Gawker hack, accounts on thousands of websites can be compromised as many users use the same email/password combination everywhere.
In that experiment, conducted in 1971 in the basement of the Stanford Psychology building, normal, healthy students were randomly assigned to the roles of prisoners and guards in a mock prison. Over the course of six days, the “guards” developed extremely authoritarian, abuse behavior towards the “prisoners”, and subjected some of the “prisoners” to torture. Philip Zimbardo, the head of the study, reflected later on the results:
The situation won; humanity lost. Out the window went the moral upbringings of these young men, as well as their middle-class civility. Power ruled, and unrestrained power became an aphrodisiac. Power without surveillance by higher authorities was a poisoned chalice that transformed character in unpredictable directions. I believe that most of us tend to be fascinated with evil not because of its consequences but because evil is a demonstration of power and domination over others.
It seems to me that the actions of the TSA could be described in the same way. Without oversight, power has taken the place of rationality and domination seems to be the goal.
This is an interesting article on how security procedures in Israel are very different from those used in North America. In Israel the focus is on the person — asking questions and looking in their eyes. In North America the focus is on stuff — that they might be carrying or concealing. Interesting differences…
Despite facing dozens of potential threats each day, the security set-up at Israel’s largest hub, Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport, has not been breached since 2002, when a passenger mistakenly carried a handgun onto a flight. How do they manage that?
“The first thing you do is to look at who is coming into your airport,” said Sela.
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